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1.
Gender in Refugee Law
Questions of gender have strongly influenced the development of inter-
national refugee law over the last few decades. This volume assesses the 
progress towards appropriate recognition of gender-related persecution in 
refugee law. It documents the advances made following intense advocacy 
around the world in the 1990s, and evaluates the extent to which gender 
has been successfully integrated into refugee law.
 Evaluating the research and advocacy agendas for gender in refugee 
law ten years beyond the 2002 UNHCR Gender Guidelines, the book 
investigates the current status of gender in refugee law. It examines 
gender-related persecution claims of both women and men, including 
those based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and explores how 
the development of an anti-refugee agenda in many Western states expo-
nentially increases vulnerability for refugees making gendered claims. The 
volume includes contributions from scholars and members of the advo-
cacy community that allow the book to examine conceptual and doctrinal 
themes arising at the intersection of gender and refugee law, and specific 
case studies across major Western refugee-receiving nations. The book will 
be of great interest and value to researchers and students of asylum and 
immigration law, international politics, and gender studies.
Efrat Arbel is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of British Colum-
bia. She works in the areas of constitutional law, refugee law, Aboriginal 
law, and prison law, in Canada and the United States.
Catherine Dauvergne is Professor of Law at the University of British 
Columbia. She works in the areas of immigration and refugee laws, in 
Canada and around the world.
Jenni Millbank is Professor of Law at University of Technology, Sydney. 
Her socio-legal scholarship is broadly concerned with gender and sexual-
ity and takes place across a number of sites including family, relationship, 
reproduction, and refugee law.
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Introduction
Gender in refugee law – from the 
margins to the centre
Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne, and Jenni Millbank
This collection aims to survey a terrain and set, or re-set, an agenda. The 
importance of an analysis focused on gender to the development of 
refugee law, and to the lives of refugees, is now well established. A signi-
ficant number of advocates and scholars have engaged in trenchant and 
pressing critique, highlighting the harms of neglecting a gendered ana-
lysis and the unjust results for women and men that come from failing to 
bring a gendered perspective into refugee decision-making. In many ways, 
the story of gender and refugee law is one of successful feminist engage-
ment with the law, leading to legal and social transformation. Policy- 
makers and decision-makers in Western refugee receiving countries 
routinely put gender on the tick-box list of topics for consideration. 
Despite this trajectory, however, in the most recent years it has become 
clear that gender is no longer at the forefront of the reform agenda for 
refugee law. As part of the shift can be explained, ironically, by the tre-
mendous successes of gender-related advocacy, we seek to evaluate what 
has been accomplished, and, more importantly, what remains to be done. 
This collection is a key part of this work.
 This book is part of a broader project investigating the current status of 
gender in refugee law, examining gender-related persecution claims of 
both women and men, including those based on sexual orientation 
(lesbian, gay, and bisexual) and gender identity (transgender and trans-
sexual). Rejecting the notion that gender is ever essential, innate, or 
clearly bounded, we strive to examine the conflicting and, at times, para-
doxical nature of gender and gender identity in refugee law. We thus look 
beyond the category of ‘women’ – as it is frequently asserted in the case 
law – to examine gender more broadly, including male and female experi-
ences of gender-related persecution, and including those based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity.
 At the opening stage of a three-year research project funded by the Aus-
tralian Research Council, we sought out the support and guidance of 
researchers and advocacy workers around the world who were engaged in 
myriad ways with questions of gender in refugee law. Part of this process 
was a collaborative conversation undertaken at the United States Law and 
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Society Association annual conference in June 2012.1 We began by circu-
lating a discussion paper that set out some of our research questions and 
our hypotheses. For the purposes of this book, the most important of 
those hypotheses were, first, that gender had been pushed from the centre 
of the refugee reform agenda, and, second, that lower level decision- 
making in relation to gender- and sexuality-based refugee claims may not 
be nearly as progressive as leading jurisprudence would suggest. We asked 
participants to respond to the discussion paper, and to bring their ideas 
into a broad conversation about the research and advocacy agendas for 
gender in refugee law. That conversation took place both formally and 
informally and has been continuing in various ways since that time. This 
volume is part of the conversation. As a group, we agreed to leave that 
conference and to contribute to a volume assessing that current state of 
research and advocacy for gender and refugee law. We asked participants 
to write about what has been accomplished and what the pressing prior-
ities are at this point in time. The papers were crafted in response to, 
rather than in advance of, the conference conversation. As such they are 
‘inputs’ rather than ‘outputs’ in our ongoing research project. We read 
this work as informing what needs to be done from here – the midpoint of 
our project – rather than as part of a presentation of the research 
findings.
 In introducing this volume, we want to outline the current agenda for 
research and advocacy in gender and refugee law, as reflected in the col-
laborative interaction of which this volume forms a part. Before outlining 
how the chapters that follow inform that agenda, it is important to under-
stand the trajectory of gender-related engagement with refugee law.
Twenty-five years on: feminist engagement with refugee law
The story of feminist engagement with refugee law started in a familiar 
place for legal feminists. A key piece of the internationally agreed upon 
definition of a refugee is a list of grounds of discrimination: race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.2 
1 The participants in this discussion included Sharryn Aiken, Deborah Anker, Efrat Arbel, 
Catherine Dauvergne, Janet Dench, Maria Hennessy, Audrey Macklin, Jenni Millbank, 
Jane Herlihy, Debora Singer, Karen Musalo, Connie Oxford, and our PhD students Janna 
Wessels and Anthea Vogl. We are also grateful to attendees at the conference who joined 
the open sessions and contributed to the conversation, and to colleagues who commented 
on our discussion paper but were unable to attend the conference.
2 Art. 1A(2) of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 
1951, 198 UNTS 137 (‘Refugee Convention’) defines a ‘refugee’ as a person who:
    owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country.
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Neither sex nor gender is on the list, let alone sexuality, gender identity, 
or family status. ‘Being left off the list’ is the easiest thing to point out as a 
starting point for feminist critique of refugee law. But even a superficial 
look at refugee jurisprudence as it stood in the early 1980s demonstrates 
quickly that the framework for refugee protection drafted in the early 
1950s was a much better fit for men than for women. The refugee defini-
tion is heavily weighted towards the experience of public actors: those who 
participate in big ‘P’ political activities and who join group activities. As 
originally envisioned, refugees were those who fled repressive regimes that 
sought to harm them because of their opposition to those regimes. It is 
easy to see, in the aftermath of the Second World War and just as Cold 
War fault lines were solidifying, where this paradigm drew its inspiration. 
The classic refugee was the Soviet dissident, the Jewish person in Germany. 
The classic oppressor was the state.
 The basic insights of second wave feminism go a good part of the way in 
developing a feminist analysis of refugee law. The ‘personal is political’ 
mantra and the insights of the public/private divide point up much of 
what made refugee law such a poor fit for the experiences of many women 
at risk of persecution around the world. Much of the original social- 
political focus of refugee law pulled decision-making away from a focus on 
how women’s actions are politicized at a personal level, and attention to 
the state as persecutor meant that persecution in private settings was 
originally characterized as beyond refugee law’s purview.
 By the 1980s, feminist calls for shifts in refugee law to recognize 
women’s experiences of persecution had been articulated in many 
Western refugee receiving states. Most activists and scholars argued that 
the most effective way to ensure that refugee law would extend equal pro-
tection for women and men would be to add sex (or gender) to the list of 
protected grounds. Already by the 1980s, however, the advocacy com-
munity could see the perils of opening the Refugee Convention for 
amendment and thus the argument was often rather for alterations to 
domestic legislation implementing the Convention in the various coun-
tries applying it.3
 Interestingly, at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) the calls for a more inclusive and proactive 
approach to refugee women were received sympathetically. This openness 
undoubtedly owes much to the views of UNHCR staff, and to the organiza-
tion’s long experience with refugees in camp situations and with the 
dilemmas of refugee resettlement. At the time of the mid-1980s, women 
and children often outnumbered men in refugee camps and resettlement 
countries were often most interested in taking in refugees who were 
3 A range of views published in the decade surrounding the first UNHCR guidelines 
includes: Foote 1994; Razack 1995; Kandt 1995; Macklin 1995; Wallace 1996; Fuldauer 
1996; Adjin-Tettey 1997; Boyd 1999; Foster 1999; Daley and Kelley 2000; Binder 2001.
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 independent economic actors: men (Labman 2007). UNHCR’s publica-
tion of Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women in 1991 was a 
logical step (UNHCR 1991), followed by its work specifically on refugee 
status determination with the Gender Guidelines (UNHCR 2002) and 
more recently on sexual orientation (UNHCR 2012).4 National guidelines, 
at different levels of decision-making and with varying degrees of binding 
influence, were introduced in Canada, the United States, Australia, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere.5
 At face value, these guidelines do both more and less than would have 
been accomplished by adding sex or gender as a protected ground within 
the text of the international refugee definition. Less because while their 
legal status varies from state to state, and is certainly ‘nil’ at the level of 
international law, the guidelines are undeniably less law-like than the text 
of the Convention. More because the guidelines attempt to spell out, with 
national variations and with varying degrees of success, what it means to 
take the concerns of women facing gender-related persecution seriously. 
The guidelines address questions of evidence and procedure, of credibility 
assessment and culture, and in doing so go well beyond what a simple 
addition of a word or two in the Convention’s text would have done.
 Most interesting at this point in time, however, is what has happened 
since the guidelines. These days, many of the most important doctrinal 
developments in refugee law are occurring in cases where the claim being 
examined is one linked to gender or sexuality. Gender cases have been at 
the forefront of jurisprudential developments that have set the standards 
for the world’s understanding of ‘particular social group’, ‘persecution’, 
and ‘state protection’ as well as the relationship between these terms (see 
Millbank 2013). Michelle Foster’s opening chapter in this volume can-
vasses the global development of this jurisprudence and considers its con-
sequences for gender- and sexuality-based claims.
 Importantly, the guidelines and the leading cases are not directly 
linked, in that the reasoning in these cases makes little explicit use of 
either domestic or UNHCR guidelines. Indeed, the country where the 
domestic guidelines have the greatest jurisprudential presence at the lower 
court levels, Canada, has not issued a leading decision on gender or sexu-
ality persecution at any time. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
decided only two refugee cases in the twenty-first century (Nemeth v Canada 
2010 and Ezokola v Canada 2013). The relationship between guidelines and 
4 In addition to the sexual orientation and gender identity guidelines, see also the collec-
tion of resources promoted by UNHCR in the ‘Special Feature’ on Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity on Refworld (UNHCR 2013).
5 The following jurisdictions now have some form of gender guideline for refugee decision-
makers: Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, European Union, Germany, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United 
States.
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leading cases is complicated and diffuse, and something that we are trying 
to tease out over the whole length of this research project. Labman and 
Dauvergne’s closing chapter demonstrates one approach to this analysis. 
We think it most plausible to say that the Canadian guidelines affirmed 
the importance and legitimacy of considering gender- and sexuality-
related persecution within refugee law. The specifics set out in the guide-
lines were, at least at the outset, less important than the general principle 
that women could be refugees on the basis of ‘private’ harms at the hands 
of ‘private’ actors.
 It is also possible that the mainstream acceptance of gender-related 
claims opened the way for sexuality-related claims. There is a strong affin-
ity in refugee law scholarship and advocacy between concerns about 
women and gender-related persecution, and concerns about sexuality-
based claims, and sexual and gender identity. This affinity has often been 
productive in advocacy terms. Indeed, a number of key jurisprudential vic-
tories that mark the movement of gender to the centre of refugee law have 
been the basis of significant advances for claims linked to sexuality-based 
persecution, and vice versa. UNHCR explicitly and emphatically argued 
that persecution based on gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation 
all stem from a common core: non-conformity to rigidly defined gender 
roles and gender norms (2002, 2012). Yet there is often a distance, or even 
a dissonance, between advocacy and analysis about refugee women and 
that concerning sexual minorities. These gaps are vital to grapple with in 
understanding the current agenda. In scholarship, policy, and decision-
making, gender and sexuality appear to be rarely understood as intimately 
related or mutually constitutive. While a number of gender guidelines now 
reference sexuality, there is rarely an unpacking of the category of homo-
sexual (or more recently the omnibus aggregation of lesbian, gay, bisex-
ual, transgender, and intersex, ‘LGBTI’) to see women and men’s vastly 
different experiences of sexuality and oppression related to it. Scholarship 
on sexuality in refugee law is attracting enormous attention currently. We 
see this in recent special journal issues (Forced Migration Review; Sexualities) 
and special volumes (Spijkerboer 2013) and conferences (Fleeing Homo-
phobia 2011, Double Jeopardy 2012) as well as in the topics that are 
drawing the attention of new graduate students. This work is pressing and 
important, to be sure, but we are concerned that it may be insufficiently 
gendered. Thinking through how to articulate gender within sexuality, and 
vice versa, rather than merely placing these categories side by side is vital 
to a research agenda moving forward, even as these two categories stand 
together in the broad arch of feminist influence on refugee law.
Advocacy from the centre
Despite the important victories, some serious things are still very 
wrong about how people making gendered claims encounter asylum 
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decision-making processes and outcomes. As we gather evidence of prac-
tices at the first instance level from around the world, it is evident that 
even in the jurisdictions with the richest promise and the longest experi-
ence of ‘gender sensitivity’, a considerable number of decisions, adminis-
trative practices, and decision-makers still would not withstand scrutiny if 
measured against the standards set by guidelines in the early 1990s. 
Debora Singer and Maria Hennessy each demonstrate in this volume that 
there are serious deficiencies in practices and outcomes in the United 
Kingdom and the European Union.
 The question of how to mobilize advocacy at this juncture therefore 
presents a dilemma that is not the typical one for feminist advocates and 
legal scholars. The concerns of gender are now formally acknowledged in 
refugee law, so the argument can no longer be for jurisprudential inclu-
sion. It must be for more meaningful, more complicated, more substantive 
analysis. And it must be an advocacy that recognizes that refugee law needs 
better outcomes overall. It is no longer useful or important to argue for 
‘equality’; most particularly in the race to the bottom characterized by 
border closing measures such as fast-tracking, detention, and attenuated 
review avenues. This is a vital insight for advocacy moving forward: improv-
ing refugee determination processes for women ought to improve refugee 
decision-making processes for everyone. Refugee determinations rely on 
complex categorical reasoning, and it is important that advocacy not 
engage in invidious comparisons between categories. In addition, efforts 
to improve conditions for refugee women and sexual minorities must 
move outside jurisprudential concerns.
 Drawing on this point, three things become clear. First, that the prob-
lems we discover about gender-related claims will frequently be indicative 
of overall problems (see both Singer and Querton, this volume). Second, 
women who are at risk of being persecuted, but whose risk is not seen as 
gender-related are increasingly disappearing from view in refugee law (see 
both Oxford and Arbel, this volume). Third, refugee law presents an 
opportunity for feminists to develop paradigms for advocacy that promote 
inclusion in new ways (see Anker, Musalo, and Hennessy, this volume).
 These dilemmas became particularly clear as our conversation at the 
Law and Society conference developed. While no one disputed our 
account of feminist engagement with refugee law, our call for information 
about the present agenda brought some disappointing, if not entirely sur-
prising, results. Moving gender concerns towards the jurisprudential core 
of refugee law appears to have been decidedly less transformative than 
one might have hoped, and simultaneously it appears to have sapped some 
of the energy of feminist legal advocacy. This point is made in various ways 
throughout this volume, and is confronted directly in Labman and Dau-
vergne’s concluding chapter. It is no longer possible – if indeed it ever was 
– to simply point at ‘the law’ and say ‘that is the problem’. So what, then, 
is the problem? And how can we build an agenda to address it?
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The unknowable and the impossibility of a global picture
In the course of our roundtable discussions we spoke of what we most 
wanted to do next, and about what we most wanted to find out. As a result, 
the conversation around the table returned again and again to the theme 
of ‘things we do not know’. Thus, in gathering up contributions for this 
volume, we asked for work on the current state of research or advocacy, 
and what comes next, asking contributors to reflect on ‘where the agenda 
is at’ in their country, jurisdiction, discipline, or organization. Of neces-
sity, this collection is about things that we do know rather than the array 
of what remains unknown and underexplored.
 But it is crucial to reflect on ‘unknowability’ in order that we can con-
tinue to reach for a better state of knowledge, or, at worst, to be realistic 
about the limits of the knowledge that we can obtain. In the roundtable 
discussions participants noted that even taking refugee claims as a starting 
point of inquiry is likely to miss the forced migration experiences of most 
women. Women’s existence precedes the edifice of a refugee status defini-
tion. It was suggested that for many women their claim to refugee status 
may never be made, or heard, or recorded, in light of factors such as being 
unable to leave the country of origin, remaining undocumented in the 
country of arrival, applying for another form of legal status that is more 
readily accessible than a refugee claim, or having a refugee claim sub-
sumed under that of a male partner. Thus refugee claims themselves may 
be dwarfed by the realm of ‘not-claims’ in gender-related persecution. 
Even within the field of refugee claims that are made, the multiple layers 
through which that experience is mediated as it is translated (both literally 
and figuratively) may erase gendered dimensions. This is well illustrated 
by one of the case studies discussed by Connie Oxford (this volume) in 
which an Iranian woman faced 74 lashes for swimming in short pants 
which breached gendered dress codes, yet made a refugee claim based on 
being part of a religious and ethnic minority: ‘People don’t say because of 
pants I left my country because that’s not a good reason to come as a 
refugee’. In one of our recent interviews with a refugee lawyer in a non-
government agency, the lawyer stated that they ‘never see pure gender-
related claims’ and explained that it was because these claims are always 
really about something else. While there are clear jurisdictional differ-
ences – in Canada we see a trend in which women’s claims are frequently 
addressed as if they are only about gender, while in Australia and else-
where they are almost never seen as ‘gender claims’ – either way this argu-
ably reflects a process in which gender is constructed as having a particular 
singularity and isolation from all other dimensions of the applicant’s 
experience and social context, rather than infusing or undergirding them.
 Working with the decisions in refugee status determinations (RSD) as 
the source material from which data can be gathered means accepting 
that it is a small and possibly unrepresentative sub-set of experiences, but 
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even taking this narrowly circumscribed route reveals more yawning gulfs 
of the unknown (and see Arbel, this volume). In many jurisdictions, and 
in UNHCR refugee status determination processes throughout the world, 
the first instance decision is at most a brief letter to the applicant rather 
than a fully reasoned and publicly accessible document. Positive decisions 
at first instance are usually not reasoned at all. Bearing in mind that most 
negative determinations either cannot or will not be appealed, the result 
is that the overwhelming majority of RSD case practice will never become 
what we know as ‘case law’. Of the tiny proportion of cases that do proceed 
to review, often to lower level administrative tribunals or immigration 
courts, written reasons continue to be summary in nature in many jurisdic-
tions, and public release policies mean that most will continue to remain 
publicly inaccessible. In Australia the tribunal has released between 20 and 
40 per cent of decisions over the past decade, while in the United States 
the Board of Immigration Appeals releases only 1.2 per cent of decisions 
(Millbank 2013, 124), a figure likely to be even lower for the United 
Kingdom tribunal. An even smaller proportion of cases will proceed to 
appellate courts where statements of law are made which are an accessible 
part of the public record. These appellate cases, although guiding author-
ity on important points of principle are in many respects a pinnacle of 
exceptionalism, an infinitesimally small tip of a gargantuan pool that may 
neither reflect the mass of cases before it nor be effective in transforming 
the practice that occurs thereafter.
 Access to the detailed picture of written reasons in individual decisions 
is, therefore, extremely limited. Also inaccessible is the broader statistical 
data that would provide the ability to put the small number of available 
decisions into some sort of context and to identify national, transnational, 
or historical trends (Arbel 2013). Many jurisdictions release annual data 
on the total number of claims made, or granted, and may break these 
down into more detailed information on country of claimant. Fewer 
provide any form of gender disaggregation of such figures, such that it is 
difficult or impossible to find out even such basic information as how 
many claimants are women or what their success rates are relative to men. 
Furthermore, only a handful of jurisdictions keep data on the Convention 
grounds of claim and even fewer break this down into the kind of claim 
such that it is coded for gender-related persecution (such as forced mar-
riage, domestic violence, and so on). Thus the number of sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity claims is often unknown, as is the proportion of 
claims by women that are overtly characterized as gender-related 
persecution.
 What we must do instead is to look at what is available and track back-
wards. Government departments responsible for the initial non-public 
level of decision-making may not be prepared to open those processes to 
observation or study, but many do record the rate at which their own deci-
sions were overturned on review. In recent years both the relevant United 
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Kingdom and Australian departments have responded to requests to 
release these figures disaggregated by gender: revealing that women claim-
ants have higher overturn rates on review than men do in both jurisdic-
tions (United Kingdom Home Office 2013; Department of Immigration 
and Citizenship 2013). Such figures, taken alone, raise more questions 
than answers: does this reflect a ‘success’ in that tribunal level decision-
makers are gender-aware? Or does it betray a failure in that initial level 
decision-makers continue to be gender-blind, have poor implementation 
of gender guidelines, and even lack awareness of gender-based persecu-
tion as the basis of a valid claim? If it is the latter then ‘better’ success rates 
on appeal reflect being worse off in actuality. Qualitative research of initial 
decisions in the United Kingdom by Asylum Aid unfortunately suggests 
the latter explanation (Singer, this volume; Muggeridge and Maman 
2011). Further qualitative research is required to excavate the meaning of 
the few figures we are able to access. Observations of case practice, inter-
views with decision-makers, lawyers, and advocates can generate a context 
in which to make sense of trends. The value and importance of this work 
is well illustrated by the thoughtful engagements of Herlihy, Bennett, and 
Oxford in this volume. But even nuanced qualitative work like this will be 
only a partial picture, and one which reflects the particular cultural and 
legal context in which it takes place. Despite an international definition 
and ‘harmonization’ measures such as the Qualification Directive in 
Europe (Council Directive 2004/83/EC; recast in 2011, Council Directive 
2011/95/EU) and the ability to seek ruling from a common court, it is 
clear that refugee decision-making, both in terms of process and sub-
stance, is very different in each national context. There will be some 
common ground, as projects like GENSEN and Fleeing Homophobia have 
demonstrated in Europe (Cheikh Ali, Querton, and Soulard 2012; Jansen 
and Spijkerboer 2011), but there will also be contrast, anomalies, and 
more threads of the simply unexplained.
 Where does that leave an international comparative project on gender-
related persecution and RSD? We suggest that it is important to acknow-
ledge that the starting point has to be one of particularity rather than 
generality. We will work with small slivers and fragments of information 
from disparate sources, only some of which will refract a light illuminating 
broader patterns. At the end of the day we will not have mapped global 
practice but instead unearthed something that is more akin to sections of 
a mosaic.
Losing ground
Another of our hypotheses that resonated at our roundtable discussions 
was that somehow despite the success of feminist engagement with refugee 
law, or maybe even because of it, research and advocacy about gender in 
refugee law has fallen out of vogue. This is not a precision measurement. 
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It is rather a sense among scholars and activists in the area, reflected and 
reinforced by the same types of indicators that demonstrate the current 
wave of focus on sexuality-based refugee claims. To wit, there is a declin-
ing rate of publications, conferences, and organizing efforts. It is worth-
while attempting to understand why this has happened, in order to work 
to reverse it.
 An important explanatory factor is the gains that have been made. There 
is a sense in many quarters that gender in refugee law ‘has been done’, and 
that the problem is now resolved. The sense of fatigue is backed up in this 
regard by our underlying assumptions of what constitutes ‘research’ and 
what constitutes ‘advocacy’. Scholarly output is measured in part by the cri-
terion of originality; as is publishing and research grant funding. Because of 
this criterion scholars must move on to new terrain, an argument that the 
insights of the 1980s and 1990s have not been carried through in practice 
risks always being perceived as un-original. Junior scholars often cannot 
afford this, and senior scholars are often the very people whose earlier cri-
tiques have yet to be meaningfully addressed.
 On the advocacy side, the problem shapes up in a different but related 
way. Since the early 1990s Western states have increasingly taken action to 
limit the number of asylum seekers crossing their borders. This trend 
gained momentum with the securitization of borders following the 11 Sep-
tember 2001 attacks in the United States. The concomitant anti-refugee 
agenda has been pursued with varying degrees of vigour in all Western 
refugee receiving states. Efrat Arbel’s analysis of the Canada–United States 
Safe Third Country Agreement in this volume is an important example of 
this agenda. Susan Kneebone’s engagement with the tension between the 
human trafficking movement and refugee law explores another key 
marker of this agenda. The pace has changed with changes of govern-
ments, but the overall trajectory towards securitization has been remark-
ably consistent. Only with the dialogue surrounding migration reform in 
the United States, culminating in movement towards comprehensive 
immigration reform in 2013, did some variation become audible. This 
agenda has formed the workplan for many refugee advocates over the past 
decade. There have been so many changes to refugee reception regimes 
that advocates have had their hands full. New legislation needs to be chal-
lenged and debated, new rules need to be digested and explained to 
clients, new legal challenges emerge to confront the new rules, whole new 
groups of people have been created who need solutions that refugee law 
cannot deliver. The pace of change itself has contributed to gender con-
cerns sliding off centre stage on the advocacy agenda. Everyone knows 
these concerns have not gone away, but they are being pushed aside by a 
wave of urgency covering the same policy terrain. In the face of ‘austerity’ 
imperatives towards faster, cheaper decision-making, simple measures 
such as gender-sensitive interpreters are too easily viewed as luxuries 
rather than necessities.
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 These factors combine with a sense that questions of gender in refugee 
law have been well aired and that significant jurisprudential changes have 
been made to push gender away from the centre of concern for refugee 
scholarship. The concern with gender, which moved so forcefully from the 
margins to the centre in decades past, is increasingly being relegated to 
the margins.
The current agenda
Against this backdrop, our aim is to re-set the agenda for research and advo-
cacy about gender and refugee law. This volume is dedicated to this under-
taking. Key elements of the current agenda arise from our starting points: it 
is important to embark on a sophisticated and sustained conversation 
between gender scholarship and sexuality scholarship; it is vital to grapple 
honestly and methodologically with the questions of un-knowability; it is 
essential to bring questions of gender to the evolving agenda of 
securitization.
 We asked contributors to this volume to join in this agenda re-setting 
exercise by mapping out the current state of affairs from their own per-
spectives. The responses, presented in the 12 chapters that follow are 
revealing: both in what they say and in what they cannot, or do not, say. 
These contributions reveal that refugee law is relentlessly local. There is 
significant variation across jurisdictions, even in areas of considerable doc-
trinal agreement at the highest level. There is also enormous concern 
about what happens in the hearing room, even as the contours of that 
room vary the concerns about disclosure (Herlihy, this volume), stereo-
types, gendered identities (Bennett, this volume), and credibility (Singer, 
this volume) are remarkably consistent. Finally, these chapters demon-
strate conclusively that the project of refugee law reform to meet the con-
cerns of gender is at best half-done, and that legal change itself can only 
be part of the story.
 One of our objectives from the outset has been to bridge between 
research and advocacy. In this respect, we have been pleasantly surprised. 
Researchers and advocates show in their contributions that they share 
many of the same priorities and truly do speak the same language. The 
barrier between these groups may be largely illusory, possibly because so 
many refugee scholars are also advocates, and because so many advocates 
view research as an essential tool of their work. This is especially evident in 
the contributions to this volume by Deborah Anker and Karen Musalo 
whose analyses draw strongly on their experiences of research as advocacy.
 But other barriers, ones we were not expecting, are also revealed in this 
collection. It is clear that knowledge is fragmented across domestic silos. It 
is equally clear that we tend to frame questions and answers within national 
or regional frameworks, and, in the case of Europe, where the framework is 
broader, it is the law that has generated this cohesion in addition to the 
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commitments of scholars and advocates (Hennessy, this volume). In this 
sense, we can read instructions about a research and advocacy agenda both 
from what our contributors say, and from what they do not say.
 In Chapter 1, Michelle Foster tackles persistent challenges and defini-
tional hurdles associated with assessing gendered claims through the lens of 
the particular social group. Surveying approaches adopted in the jurispru-
dence of a wide range of jurisdictions, both common and civil law, Foster 
demonstrates that despite persuasive high level cases consistently determin-
ing that women/sex/gender can satisfy the ‘social group’ requirements for 
the purpose of the Refugee Convention, lower level decision-makers none-
theless struggle with this task. Decisions on gender tend towards recognizing 
highly particularized or, in Foster’s words, ‘overly convoluted and artificially 
contrived’ formulations (see also Labman and Dauvergne, this volume), or 
rely on criteria long proved unreliable for assessing gender claims, such as 
importing additional requirements of social visibility. Offering detailed criti-
cism of the particular social group jurisprudence, Foster highlights both the 
promise and the perils of this ‘nebulous’ category.
 Chapters 2 and 3 reflect on the development of gender asylum law in the 
United States. Deborah E. Anker tells the story of how gender claims gained 
recognition in US law despite the lack of high level jurisprudence clearly 
accepting gender as a particular social group. Her chapter describes how 
direct representation of women asylum seekers by advocacy groups like the 
Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinic helped to transform United States 
asylum law by bringing the lived realities of women asylum seekers before 
decision-makers (Chapter 2). Karen Musalo examines two such trans-
formative moments in detail by telling the story of two women: Fauziya 
Kassindja, who sought asylum in the United States to escape the prospect of 
genital cutting, and Rody Alvarado, who sought asylum in the United States 
to escape the prospect of domestic violence (Chapter 3). These women’s 
stories illuminate how United States law has moved towards recognizing 
exoticized harms like genital cutting as an established basis for asylum pro-
tection, but is still inconsistent – or in Musalo’s words, schizophrenic – in its 
treatment of quotidian harms like domestic violence (see also Labman and 
Dauvergne concerning Canada). These two chapters shed light on how 
United States law responds – or fails to respond – at the level of doctrine 
and practice. Musalo’s chapter also reveals the research and advocacy chal-
lenges of alliances with a broad ‘feminist’ community – a concern that subtly 
touches a number of aspects of an agenda-shaping project.
 Chapters 4 to 8 analyse barriers women face in advancing gender-
related asylum claims in the refugee status determination processes in 
Europe, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Focusing on the 
issue of credibility in women’s claims, Debora Singer points to persistent 
challenges faced by women seeking asylum in Europe – high standards of 
proof, unavailability of corroborative evidence, and the impact of shame 
and trauma on disclosure and demeanour – and arrives at the conclusion 
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that women are simply less likely to be believed (Chapter 4). Jane Herlihy 
examines the effects of shame and trauma, exploring some of the psycho-
logical barriers to refugee status determinations rooted in understandings 
and expressions of gender (Chapter 5). Herlihy advocates for a better 
understanding of how extreme distress triggers extreme emotional 
responses, and a more nuanced, flexible understanding of emotion in the 
asylum setting. Claire Bennett adds to this discussion by exploring these 
dynamics drawing upon her interviews with lesbian asylum applicants in 
the United Kingdom (Chapter 6). Her analysis charts how claimants 
reflect upon the asylum process, and how this process of being evaluated 
and judged impacts upon their social and sexual identity. Contextualizing 
women’s narratives within current debates surrounding sexuality and 
asylum, Bennett argues that the experience of ‘not being believed’ risks 
re-traumatizing claimants, re-inscribing experiences of injury and loss, and 
further complicating their prospects of recovery and social inclusion.
 Connie Oxford surveys results from ethnographic fieldwork conducted 
with women refugee claimants, and identifies persistent underlying norms 
and assumptions that limit the scope of protection available to women 
claimants in the United States (Chapter 7). As with Herlihy and Bennett, 
Oxford starts with the experience of claimants and explores how law fails 
to ‘hear’ their narratives of gender-related harms, but also how claimants 
themselves censor, edit, or recraft their narratives to fit within legal cat-
egories and expectations of RSD norms and values. Maria Hennessy points 
to similar barriers in Europe, and advocates for the use of strategic litiga-
tion and training to improve decision-making and integrate gendered per-
spectives in asylum systems across the European Union (Chapter 8).
 Chapters 9, 10, and 11 analyse refugee protection alongside – and in 
connection with – trafficking, armed conflict, and border crossing. Susan 
Kneebone compares gendered discourses deployed in trafficking policy 
with those operative in refugee law, to analyse how gender is understood in 
each setting, in particular examining the role of the victim/agent dicho-
tomy (Chapter 9). Drawing upon recent cases from the United Kingdom 
and Australia in which trafficked women were the applicants for pro tection 
under refugee law, Kneebone identifies possibilities for cross- fertilization 
between refugee and trafficking frameworks when trafficked women seek 
legal protection. Christel Querton’s chapter traces how decision- makers in 
the United Kingdom have interpreted the Refugee Convention in cases 
involving asylum claims from women fleeing armed conflict (Chapter 10). 
Querton’s analysis points to a protection gap, and the persistent failure of 
decision-makers to understand and explore the impact of armed conflict 
through a gendered lens. Efrat Arbel’s work points to a different kind of 
gap – an informational gap. Examining the Safe Third Country Agreement 
between the United States and Canada, Arbel points to barriers that make 
it harder to identify precisely how the Agreement impacts upon women 
(Chapter 11). Arbel cautions that given this lack of knowledge, the new 
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fault lines of Canadian refugee law and policy may be charted in ways that 
overlook the specific protection needs of women.
 In Chapter 12, Shauna Labman and Catherine Dauvergne echo some 
of the questions identified by Foster at the start of this volume: how to fit 
women’s asylum claims within the categories established by refugee law, 
how to bend these categories to fit women, and how to struggle against the 
purported stability of these categories. Reflecting on Audrey Macklin’s 
seminal piece, ‘Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories’, 
Labman and Dauvergne evaluate the current situation for women claim-
ing refugee protection in Canada, considering the inter-relation between 
public discourse, high level doctrinal developments, and scholarly cri-
tique. Their analysis advocates bringing gender back to the centre of the 
scholarly and advocacy agenda.
 The agenda that emerges from this volume is at one level straight-
forward. The work of integrating considerations of gender into the centre 
of refugee law is incomplete. This collection gives us a clearer sense of why 
this has happened, but also demonstrates convincingly that an explanation 
is not a justification. Indeed, it is clear that while much has been accomp-
lished, in the most recent years ground has also been lost. One reason for 
this loss is the anti-refugee agenda which has emerged in most Western 
states. This agenda has served to draw advocacy attention and resources 
away from gender concerns, to other important areas. The lessons of our 
work here are, thus, twofold. First, because an anti-refugee agenda 
increases vulnerability for all refugees through devices like shortened 
timelines and reduced support resources, we must anticipate that it 
increases vulnerability for refugees making gendered claims exponentially. 
Second, because outcomes for women seeking protection have led the 
development of refugee law for 20 years, failing to attend to these out-
comes risks failing refugee law. Our argument is to return gender to the 
centre of research and advocacy in refugee law.
 We want to acknowledge the vital contributions to this volume made by 
our research assistants in Vancouver and Sydney. As any volume nears 
completion the challenge of details and double-checking looms large. For 
energy, enthusiasm, tireless re-checking well past nightfall, and never 
losing sight of the big picture, we are grateful to Harshada Despande, 
Brendan Naef, Catherine Repel, and Janna Wessels.
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